The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law

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The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law. / Eklund, Hanna.

I: Common Market Law Review, Bind 59, Nr. 5, 2022, s. 1407 – 1444.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Eklund, H 2022, 'The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law', Common Market Law Review, bind 59, nr. 5, s. 1407 – 1444. https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2022096

APA

Eklund, H. (2022). The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law. Common Market Law Review, 59(5), 1407 – 1444. https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2022096

Vancouver

Eklund H. The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law. Common Market Law Review. 2022;59(5):1407 – 1444. https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2022096

Author

Eklund, Hanna. / The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law. I: Common Market Law Review. 2022 ; Bind 59, Nr. 5. s. 1407 – 1444.

Bibtex

@article{9cd591c55da040ff878bd0bbac3da1bd,
title = "The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law",
abstract = "This article analyses the ECJ{\textquoteright}s use of the margin of discretion technique to adjudicate on fundamental rights. It argues that the margin of discretion operates in a way that incorporates the interpretations of national decision-makers into the ECJ{\textquoteright}s formulation of EU fundamental rights. In so doing, the margin of discretion does not uphold boundaries between national and European rights. Rather, it allows the national decision-maker and the ECJ to co-create the standard of protection of fundamental rights. The argument is based on an analysis of case law from the late 1970s to the early 2020s, and accounts for overlooked yet important distinctions between different uses of the technique. It shows that the ECJ{\textquoteright}s use of the margin of discretion is not synonymous with the ECtHR{\textquoteright}s margin of appreciation doctrine. The article contributes to the debate about the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law, namely the question of how national boundaries are, or should be, manifested.",
author = "Hanna Eklund",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.54648/cola2022096",
language = "English",
volume = "59",
pages = "1407 – 1444",
journal = "Common Market Law Review",
issn = "0165-0750",
publisher = "Kluwer Law International",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The margin of discretion and the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law

AU - Eklund, Hanna

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - This article analyses the ECJ’s use of the margin of discretion technique to adjudicate on fundamental rights. It argues that the margin of discretion operates in a way that incorporates the interpretations of national decision-makers into the ECJ’s formulation of EU fundamental rights. In so doing, the margin of discretion does not uphold boundaries between national and European rights. Rather, it allows the national decision-maker and the ECJ to co-create the standard of protection of fundamental rights. The argument is based on an analysis of case law from the late 1970s to the early 2020s, and accounts for overlooked yet important distinctions between different uses of the technique. It shows that the ECJ’s use of the margin of discretion is not synonymous with the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine. The article contributes to the debate about the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law, namely the question of how national boundaries are, or should be, manifested.

AB - This article analyses the ECJ’s use of the margin of discretion technique to adjudicate on fundamental rights. It argues that the margin of discretion operates in a way that incorporates the interpretations of national decision-makers into the ECJ’s formulation of EU fundamental rights. In so doing, the margin of discretion does not uphold boundaries between national and European rights. Rather, it allows the national decision-maker and the ECJ to co-create the standard of protection of fundamental rights. The argument is based on an analysis of case law from the late 1970s to the early 2020s, and accounts for overlooked yet important distinctions between different uses of the technique. It shows that the ECJ’s use of the margin of discretion is not synonymous with the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine. The article contributes to the debate about the boundary question in EU fundamental rights law, namely the question of how national boundaries are, or should be, manifested.

U2 - 10.54648/cola2022096

DO - 10.54648/cola2022096

M3 - Journal article

VL - 59

SP - 1407

EP - 1444

JO - Common Market Law Review

JF - Common Market Law Review

SN - 0165-0750

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 321466942