In 1920, when the Advisory Committee of Jurists was appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to be responsible for the development of a Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), it was conventional wisdom among scholars that only states could possess international legal personality. It would therefore seem safe to assume that the limited role of individuals under the adopted Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ Statute) was a direct result of the orthodox ‘states-only’ conception, which by definition barred individuals from being subjects of international law. But, as present article aims to show, this assumption falls apart upon closer scrutiny of the discussions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists in relation to two separate issues involving individuals: 1) The procedural role of the individual before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), and 2) the establishment of a High Court of International Justice with jurisdiction over international crimes. Rather than doctrinal quandaries relating to the concept of international legal personality, the conclusions of the vast majority of members of the Advisory Committee appear to have turned upon whether they perceived the particular issue to require a solution from international law, or whether they believed it could be adequately solved through domestic law.