A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes
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A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. / Dothan, Shai; Lam, Joanna.
Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law. red. / Günes Ünüvar; Joanna Lam; Shai Dothan. Springer, 2020. s. 1-25 (European Yearbook of International Economic Law).Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning
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TY - CHAP
T1 - A Paradigm Shift?
T2 - Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes
AU - Dothan, Shai
AU - Lam, Joanna
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors’ disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.
AB - Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors’ disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.
U2 - 10.1007/8165_2020_50
DO - 10.1007/8165_2020_50
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 9783030456832
T3 - European Yearbook of International Economic Law
SP - 1
EP - 25
BT - Permanent Investment Courts
A2 - Ünüvar, Günes
A2 - Lam, Joanna
A2 - Dothan, Shai
PB - Springer
ER -
ID: 260411154