A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning

Standard

A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. / Dothan, Shai; Lam, Joanna.

Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law. red. / Günes Ünüvar; Joanna Lam; Shai Dothan. Springer, 2020. s. 1-25 (European Yearbook of International Economic Law).

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning

Harvard

Dothan, S & Lam, J 2020, A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. i G Ünüvar, J Lam & S Dothan (red), Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law. Springer, European Yearbook of International Economic Law, s. 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_50

APA

Dothan, S., & Lam, J. (2020). A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. I G. Ünüvar, J. Lam, & S. Dothan (red.), Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law (s. 1-25). Springer. European Yearbook of International Economic Law https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_50

Vancouver

Dothan S, Lam J. A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. I Ünüvar G, Lam J, Dothan S, red., Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law. Springer. 2020. s. 1-25. (European Yearbook of International Economic Law). https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2020_50

Author

Dothan, Shai ; Lam, Joanna. / A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes. Permanent Investment Courts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law. red. / Günes Ünüvar ; Joanna Lam ; Shai Dothan. Springer, 2020. s. 1-25 (European Yearbook of International Economic Law).

Bibtex

@inbook{c81d379e76a74408ace48f80e741dd52,
title = "A Paradigm Shift?: Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes",
abstract = "Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors{\textquoteright} disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.",
author = "Shai Dothan and Joanna Lam",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1007/8165_2020_50",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030456832",
series = "European Yearbook of International Economic Law",
pages = "1--25",
editor = "G{\"u}nes {\"U}n{\"u}var and Joanna Lam and Shai Dothan",
booktitle = "Permanent Investment Courts",
publisher = "Springer",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - A Paradigm Shift?

T2 - Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes

AU - Dothan, Shai

AU - Lam, Joanna

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors’ disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.

AB - Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors’ disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.

U2 - 10.1007/8165_2020_50

DO - 10.1007/8165_2020_50

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 9783030456832

T3 - European Yearbook of International Economic Law

SP - 1

EP - 25

BT - Permanent Investment Courts

A2 - Ünüvar, Günes

A2 - Lam, Joanna

A2 - Dothan, Shai

PB - Springer

ER -

ID: 260411154