Sorting and sustaining cooperation
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Sorting and sustaining cooperation. / Vikander, Nick.
In: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2013, p. 548-566.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Sorting and sustaining cooperation
AU - Vikander, Nick
N1 - JEL classifications: L23, D82, M50
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort.
AB - This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
U2 - 10.1093/oep/gps030
DO - 10.1093/oep/gps030
M3 - Journal article
VL - 65
SP - 548
EP - 566
JO - Oxford Economic Papers
JF - Oxford Economic Papers
SN - 0030-7653
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 71471942