Violating International Law is Contagious
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Violating International Law is Contagious. / Dothan, Shai.
I: Chicago Journal of International Law, Bind 23, Nr. 1, 2022, s. 79-89.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Violating International Law is Contagious
AU - Dothan, Shai
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is amechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but alsoincrease their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with internationallaw is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not astrategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate internationallaw, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating internationallaw contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they breakinternational law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.
AB - Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is amechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but alsoincrease their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with internationallaw is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not astrategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate internationallaw, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating internationallaw contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they breakinternational law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.
M3 - Journal article
VL - 23
SP - 79
EP - 89
JO - Chicago Journal of International Law
JF - Chicago Journal of International Law
SN - 1529-0816
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 300076845