Country Report Denmark: Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportBidrag til bog/antologiForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

Country Report Denmark : Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage . / Afsah, Ebrahim.

Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe: Vol. 1 Field Description. Berlin : Springer, 2018.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportBidrag til bog/antologiForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Afsah, E 2018, Country Report Denmark: Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage . i Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe: Vol. 1 Field Description. Springer, Berlin.

APA

Afsah, E. (2018). Country Report Denmark: Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage . I Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe: Vol. 1 Field Description Springer.

Vancouver

Afsah E. Country Report Denmark: Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage . I Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe: Vol. 1 Field Description. Berlin: Springer. 2018

Author

Afsah, Ebrahim. / Country Report Denmark : Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage . Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe: Vol. 1 Field Description. Berlin : Springer, 2018.

Bibtex

@inbook{9d0656bd921640edbc71435e6274ab07,
title = "Country Report Denmark: Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage ",
abstract = "As a small, open economy Denmark has a pursued a distinct path of capitalist production that relies heavily on innovation in design, production and administration and, therefore, a deliberate dependency on sophisticated information technology and intellectual property. The state has long since recognised the elevated and persistent risk posed by attacks on crucial information technology infrastructure and industrial espionage for Denmark{\textquoteright}s continued prosperity and social stability. This acknowledged heighted threat level contrasts with the somewhat counter-intuitive observation that its citizens seem to evince great trust in the ability of the political and legal institutions to protect them – in sharp contrast to declining and relatively low levels in the large industrial states. With respect to threats posed by industrial espionage and network disruption, the response by the state and business community appears to rely less on penal prosecution than technology-driven and community-supported early warning. The state stresses prevention, detection and technical counter-measures through voluntary cooperation by affected public authorities and private enterprises; only in militarily relevant areas are mandatory measures contemplated. Consequently, Danish authorities have focused on strengthening inner-Danish technical capacities of both public authorities and private companies to detect and insulate against electronic intrusion, rather than collecting litigation-relevant evidence.",
author = "Ebrahim Afsah",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
booktitle = "Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe",
publisher = "Springer",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Country Report Denmark

T2 - Penal Provisions and Institutional Counter-Measures against Industrial Espionage

AU - Afsah, Ebrahim

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - As a small, open economy Denmark has a pursued a distinct path of capitalist production that relies heavily on innovation in design, production and administration and, therefore, a deliberate dependency on sophisticated information technology and intellectual property. The state has long since recognised the elevated and persistent risk posed by attacks on crucial information technology infrastructure and industrial espionage for Denmark’s continued prosperity and social stability. This acknowledged heighted threat level contrasts with the somewhat counter-intuitive observation that its citizens seem to evince great trust in the ability of the political and legal institutions to protect them – in sharp contrast to declining and relatively low levels in the large industrial states. With respect to threats posed by industrial espionage and network disruption, the response by the state and business community appears to rely less on penal prosecution than technology-driven and community-supported early warning. The state stresses prevention, detection and technical counter-measures through voluntary cooperation by affected public authorities and private enterprises; only in militarily relevant areas are mandatory measures contemplated. Consequently, Danish authorities have focused on strengthening inner-Danish technical capacities of both public authorities and private companies to detect and insulate against electronic intrusion, rather than collecting litigation-relevant evidence.

AB - As a small, open economy Denmark has a pursued a distinct path of capitalist production that relies heavily on innovation in design, production and administration and, therefore, a deliberate dependency on sophisticated information technology and intellectual property. The state has long since recognised the elevated and persistent risk posed by attacks on crucial information technology infrastructure and industrial espionage for Denmark’s continued prosperity and social stability. This acknowledged heighted threat level contrasts with the somewhat counter-intuitive observation that its citizens seem to evince great trust in the ability of the political and legal institutions to protect them – in sharp contrast to declining and relatively low levels in the large industrial states. With respect to threats posed by industrial espionage and network disruption, the response by the state and business community appears to rely less on penal prosecution than technology-driven and community-supported early warning. The state stresses prevention, detection and technical counter-measures through voluntary cooperation by affected public authorities and private enterprises; only in militarily relevant areas are mandatory measures contemplated. Consequently, Danish authorities have focused on strengthening inner-Danish technical capacities of both public authorities and private companies to detect and insulate against electronic intrusion, rather than collecting litigation-relevant evidence.

M3 - Book chapter

BT - Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe

PB - Springer

CY - Berlin

ER -

ID: 181579048