Tilregnelsen i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten

Forsvar af ph.d.-afhandling ved Tommy Pedersen.

 

Afhandlingen om tilregnelsen i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten omhandler alene unddragelsessager, der er afsluttet ved domstolene. Det vil sige sager, hvor tiltalte (T) er dømt eller frifundet i en skatte- og/eller afgiftsunddragelsessag. Konkrete domme om ordensforbrydelser inddrages dog, når dette findes relevant.

Ordensforbrydelsen relaterer sig til Ts tilsidesættelse af en ordensforskrift, hvor selve pligtforsømmelsen sanktioneres med en ”ordensbøde” uden hensyn til, om dette har resulteret i fx en afgiftsunddragelse.

Tilregnelse er et spørgsmål om Ts subjektive skyld i forhold til forbrydelsens objektive gerningselementer.

T kan kun idømmes straf i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten, såfremt T i gerningsøjeblikket overtrådte den konkrete skatte- eller afgiftsstraffebestemmelse både objektivt og subjektivt. Simpel uagtsomhed er som altovervejende hovedregel straffri i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten. T kan således alene idømmes straf, såfremt Ts tilregnelse var forsætligt efter fx skattekontrolloven (SKL) § 82, stk. 1, eller T udviste grov uagtsomhed i medfør af SKL § 82, stk. 2.

De centrale forskningsspørgsmål i afhandlingen drejer sig om, hvilke direkte og/eller indirekte beviser der almindeligvis kan føre til, at en dansk domstol i skatte- og afgiftsstraffesager statuerer forsæt, grov uagtsomhed eller simpel uagtsomhed, om der forekommer et eller flere mønstre heri, og hvordan sådanne eventuelle mønstre i forhåndsformodninger om bevis kan beskrives og systematiseres. Konklusionerne på disse forskningsspørgsmål beskrives sammenfattende på den måde, at ”der gælder en forhåndsformodningsregel om forsæt, når T har…”, og tilsvarende gør sig gældende vedrørende grov uagtsomhed og simpel uagtsomhed. Hertil fokuseres på underspørgsmålet om, hvilken tilregnelse T almindeligvis har i en skatte- og afgiftsstraffesag, når T har forsømt at sikre sig, at en relevant regel er overholdt, samt om der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler herom. Øvrige underspørgsmål, begrundelser og konklusioner behandles de relevante steder i afhandlingen.

Afhandlingen består af 10 kapitler bestående af et hovedkapitel (kapitel 5 ”Tilregnelsen i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten”), underkapitler, hovedpunkter og underpunkter. De analyserede og vurderede domme i kapitel 3-8 anvendes til at afklare afhandlingens forskningsspørgsmål.

I kapitel 1 introduceres afhandlingens emne, begrundelse, afgrænsning, formål, problemstillinger og forskningsspørgsmålene, ligesom der redegøres for udvalgte relevante strafferetlige begreber. Kapitel 2 omhandler afhandlingens metode (den retdogmatiske metode) samt en redegørelse for afhandlingens primære og sekundære retskilder.

I kapitel 3 beskrives udvalgte relevante skatteregler, retssikkerhedslovens (RSL) § 9 om forholdet til strafferetsplejen, RSL § 10 og artikel 6 i Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention i relation til selvinkriminering samt muligheden for parallelle forløb med ekstraordinær genoptagelse af skatteansættelsen efter skatteforvaltningslovens (SFL) § 27, stk. 1, nr. 5, og SKL § 82-sager. Herefter omtales opstarten af en skattesag, skattesagens overgang til administrativ skattestraffesag, skattestraffesagens videresendelse til politimæssig efterforskning, og skattestraffesagens afslutning ved domstolene. Det konkluderes bl.a., at T kan idømmes straf for grov uagtsomhed efter princippet ”det mindre i det mere”, selv om T ifølge anklageskriftet er tiltalt for forsæt, og at anklagemyndigheden lettere kan bevise grov uagtsomhed end forsæt. Udvalgte relevante spørgsmål om forskelle og ligheder vedrørende SKL § 82- sager og SFL § 27, stk. 1, nr. 5-sager undersøges på grundlag af en analyse af relevante domme. Det konkluderes bl.a., at der er sammenfald mellem begreberne forsæt og grov uagtsomhed i SFL § 27, stk. 1, nr. 5, og SKL § 82, og at in dubio pro reo alene finder anvendelse i straffesager fx skattestraffesager.

Kapitel 4 omhandler bevis i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten. Det konkluderes bl.a., at der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler om, at når anklagemyndigheden har løftet bevisbyrden for, at T har handlet forsætligt eller groft uagtsomt, har T bevisbyrden for, at T ikke er skyldig (uægte bevisbyrde). Hvis T vælger ikke at bidrage med oplysninger til sagen, som T antageligt er bekendt med, og/eller T ikke kan modbevise, at indsatte beløb på Ts konto er skattefrie erhvervelser, idømmes T straf. Det konkluderes endvidere, at der gælder en større tvivlsmargen angående de subjektive end objektive gerningsmomenter, at beviskravet er strengere vedrørende de objektive end subjektive gerningsmomenter, og at princippet om in dubio pro reo ikke angår retsanvendelsen.

I kapitel 5 konkluderes bl.a., at direkte forsæt, sandsynlighedsforsæt, dolus eventualis (i formen hypotetisk forsæt), men også positiv indvilligelse og dolus Alexanderson er omfattet af forarbejderne til straffeloven (STRL). Retspraksis vedrørende skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten viser, at alle grader af forsæt er gældende i sager om både fx SKL §§ 82 og 83, momslovens § 81 og STRL § 289. Der kan være sammenfald mellem Ts motiv og tilregnelse. Forsætvurderingen for personer, der er utilregnelige, sker ud fra en almindelig menneskelig målestok, og når Ts objektive gerning klart bærer præg af at høre til dem, der tilregnes en normal gerningsperson som forsætlig, har T forsæt. Efterfølgende tilregnelse i solorealisationer og passiv medvirken finder anvendelse i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten.

Retspraksis viser, at der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler for tilregnelsesbedømmelsen i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten. Ts tilregnelse er forsætlig i 11 udvalgte relevante spørgsmål, fx når Ts udeholdelse af skattepligtig indkomst angår en skatteunddragelse, der er et absolut og relativt stort beløb. T har handlet groft uagtsomt i 7 udvalgte relevante situationer, fx når T i gerningsøjeblikket ikke gjorde, hvad man med føje kunne forvente, at T burde have gjort for at sikre sig, at den relevante lovgivning blev overholdt. T har udvist simpel uagtsomhed, når T i gerningsøjeblikket fx var i en særlig undskyldelig forsætsudelukkende faktisk vildfarelse (fx fejl på grund af EDB-nedbrud) eller i en særlig undskyldelig retlig vildfarelse (fx på grund af Ts særlige minusfaktorer fx psykiske defekter).

Kapitel 6 angår tilregnelsen vedrørende erhvervsvirksomheder, og hvornår der kan opstilles forhåndsformodninger for, at T har forsæt, grov eller simpel uagtsomhed i denne type skatte- og afgiftsstraffesager. Det konkluderes bl.a., at der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler for de tre nævnte typer tilregnelse, vedrørende virksomhedsindehaveres ”uagtsomhedsfiktion”, stråmandssager, Ts særlige plusfaktorer, ”uregistreret virksomhed”, og interessentskaber, samt at der udvises tilbageholdenhed med at idømme interessentskaber straf i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten.

I kapitel 7 beskrives rådgiversager i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten og ansvarsfordelingen mellem rådgiver (R) og dennes klient/kunde (K). Det konkluderes bl.a., at der er domme om nær og fjern medvirken i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten, og at det almindeligvis er lettere at føre bevis for nær end fjern medvirken.

Der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler om, at R og K har forsæt (fx hvis R og K har aftalt at begå forbrydelsen), grov uagtsomhed (hvor vedkommende fx var i en forsætsudelukkende vildfarelse) eller simpel uagtsomhed (hvor pågældende var i en særlig undskyldelig vildfarelse). Der er i hvert fald 12 skatte- og/eller afgiftsstraffesager, hvor R er tiltalt i en rådgiversag for at have udvist grov uagtsomhed.

R er underlagt en streng tilregnelsesbedømmelse, men anklagemyndigheden synes i 27 sager i skatte og afgiftsstrafferetten at have udvist tilbageholdenhed med at rejse tiltale mod R, selv om R som bistandsyder rådgav pligtsubjektet K fejlagtigt, fordi R enten var i en negativ faktisk vildfarelse eller en negativ uegentlig retsvildfarelse.

Kapitel 8 omhandler vildfarelser, bevisbedømmelsen og bevisbyrden i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten. Det påvises, at der tilsyneladende kun er én dom i skatte- og afgiftsstrafferetten, hvor T idømmes straf for en putativ forbrydelse (én utrykt dom fra 1971). T har ”reelt” bevisbyrden for, at T i gerningsøjeblikket var i en forsætsudelukkende negativ faktisk vildfarelse og/eller en negativ uegentlig retsvildfarelse i skatte- og/eller afgiftsstraffesager i relation til, om der skal ske beskatning af indkomst stammende fra udenlandske indtægter, sortløn og private renteindtægter. T er pålagt en streng ”omvendt” bevisbyrde (uægte bevisbyrde) for, at T var i en forsætsudelukkende faktisk eller retlig vildfarelse, når T har afgivet urigtige oplysninger om fradrag. Negative faktiske vildfarelser og negative uegentlige retsvildfarelser kan være særligt undskyldelige, således at domstolene statuerer straffri simpel uagtsomhed. Retspraksis viser, at der foreligger en negativ uegentlig retsvildfarelse, når T fx har misforstået en til skattestraffesagen underliggende materiel regel om skat, der er bestemmende for, om der er sket en unddragelse, samt at in dubio pro reo finder anvendelse angående både faktiske og retlige vildfarelser.

På grundlag af domsanalyserne i kapitel 3-8 er konklusionen på forskningsspørgsmålene helt overordnet, at der på basis af retspraksis kan opstilles forhåndsformodningsregler for, hvilke bevismomenter domstolene lægger vægt på ved afgørelsen af, om en unddragelse er forvoldt ved en tilregnelse af henholdsvis forsæt, grov eller simpel uagtsomhed, og at der gælder forhåndsformodningsregler om tilregnelsesbedømmelsen, når T i gerningsøjeblikket havde forsømt at sikre sig, at en relevant regel blev overholdt. T har efter omstændighederne forsæt, når T bevidst undlod at sikre sig mod et lovbrud, grov uagtsomhed såfremt T burde have sikret sig mod lovbruddet og simpel uagtsomhed, hvis T var i en særlig undskyldelig faktisk og/eller retlig vildfarelse.

I kapitel 9 ”Komparativ ret” undersøges udvalgte relevante problemstillinger i svensk, norsk og dansk lov og retspraksis. Det konkluderes bl.a., at forsæt i formen hypotetisk forsæt (T har indset gerningsindholdets realisering som mulig, og retten lægger til grund, at T ville have handlet som sket, hvis T havde haft sikker viden om, at lovbruddet ville indtræde) er gældende i dansk ret, men ikke i svensk og norsk ret.

I kapitel 10 beskrives afhandlingens overordnede konklusioner og perspektivering.

 

 

This paper on imputation in criminal tax law deals only with evasion cases that have been finalised by the courts. That is, cases where the defendant (D) has been convicted or acquitted in a tax and/or duty evasion case. However, specific convictions for disorderly conduct offences are included when relevant.

The disorderly conduct relates to D's violation of a regulation, where the breach of duty itself is sanctioned with a "disorderly conduct fine" regardless of whether this has resulted in, for example, a tax evasion.

Imputability is a question of D's subjective guilt in relation to the objective elements of the offence. D can only be sentenced under criminal tax law if, at the time of the offence, D violated the specific tax penalty provision both objectively and subjectively: Simple negligence is, as a general rule, not punishable under criminal tax law. D can only be sentenced if D's subjective guilt, for example, was intentional under section 82(1) of the Tax Control Act or D showed gross negligence under section 82(2) of the Tax Control Act.

The central research questions in the paper concern which direct and/or indirect evidence can generally lead to a Danish court in criminal tax cases finding intent, gross negligence or simple negligence, whether there are one or more patterns in this, and how such possible patterns in presumptions of evidence can be described and systematised. The conclusions to these research questions are summarized as "there is a presumption of intent when D has...", and the same applies to gross negligence and simple negligence.

To this end, the focus is on the subquestion of what imputability D usually has in a tax offence case when D has failed to ensure that a relevant rule has been complied with, and whether prior presumption rules apply. Other subquestions, reasoning and conclusions are addressed in the relevant places in the paper.

The paper consists of 10 chapters consisting of a main chapter (Chapter 5 "Imputation in criminal tax law"), subchapters, main points and subpoints. The analysed and assessed judgements in chapters 3-8 are used to clarify the research questions of this paper.

Chapter 1 introduces the topic, reasoning, delimitation, purpose, problems and research questions of the paper, as well as explaining selected relevant criminal law concepts.

Chapter 2 deals with the methodology of the paper (the legal dogmatic method) and an account of the paper's primary and secondary legal sources.

Chapter 3 describes selected relevant tax rules, section 9 of the Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters on the relationship with the criminal justice system, section 10 of the Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to self-incrimination, as well as the possibility of parallel processes with extraordinary reopening of the tax assessment under section 27(1)(5) of the Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters and Tax Control Act section 82 cases. This is followed by the start of a tax case, the transition of the tax case to an administrative tax penalty case, the transfer of the tax penalty case to police investigation, and the conclusion of the tax penalty case in court. Among other things, it is concluded that D can be sentenced for gross negligence according to "the less in the more" principle, even though D is charged with intent according to the indictment, and that the prosecution can more easily prove gross negligence than intent. Selected relevant questions about differences and similarities regarding Tax Control Act section 82 cases and Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters section 27(1)(5) cases are examined on the basis of an analysis of relevant judgements. It is concluded, among other things, that the concepts of intent and gross negligence in section 27(1)(5) of the Consolidation Act on Legal Protection and Administration in Social Matters and section 82 of the Tax Control Act coincide and that in dubio pro reo only applies in criminal cases such as tax cases.

Chapter 4 describes evidence in criminal tax law. Among other things, it is concluded that prior presumption rules apply that when the prosecution has lifted the burden of proof that D has acted intentionally or grossly negligent, D has the burden of proof that D is not guilty (false burden of proof). If D chooses not to contribute information to the case that D is presumably aware of and/or D cannot disprove that amounts deposited in D's account are tax-free acquisitions, D will be penalised. It is also concluded that there is a greater margin of doubt regarding the subjective than objective elements of the offence, that the standard of proof is stricter regarding the objective than subjective elements of the offence, and that the principle of in dubio pro reo does not affect the application of the law.

In chapter 5 the author concludes, among other things, that direct intent, probable intent, dolus eventualis (in the form of hypothetical intent), but also positive consent and dolus Alexanderson are covered by the preparatory works to the Criminal Code. Case law regarding criminal tax law shows that all degrees of intent are applicable in cases concerning, e.g. sections 82 and 83 of the Tax Control Act, section 81 of the VAT Act and section 289 of the Criminal Code. There may be a coincidence between D's motive and imputation. The assessment of intent for persons of unsound mind is based on an ordinary human yardstick and when D's objective act is clearly characterised as belonging to those attributed to a normal offender as intentional, D has intent. Subsequent imputation in solo realisations and passive complicity are applicable in criminal tax law.

Case law shows that prior presumption rules apply to the assessment of imputability in criminal tax law. D's imputation is intentional in 11 selected relevant issues, e.g. when D's withholding of taxable income concerns a tax evasion that is an absolute and relatively large amount. D acted with gross negligence in seven selected relevant situations, e.g. when D at the time of the offence did not do what could reasonably be expected that D should have done to ensure that the relevant legislation was complied with. D has been guilty of simple negligence if, at the time of the offence, D was in a particularly excusable error of fact (e.g. error due to a computer breakdown) or in a particularly excusable error of law (e.g. due to particular negative factors affecting D, such as mental defects).

Chapter 6 deals with the imputation of business enterprises and when it can be presumed that D has intent, gross negligence or simple negligence in this type of tax offence. Among other things, it is concluded that prior presumption rules apply to the three types of imputation mentioned, regarding the "negligence fiction" of business owners, straw man case, D's special plus factors, "unregistered business", and partnerships, and that there is restraint in imposing penalties on partnerships in criminal tax law.

Chapter 7 describes adviser cases in tax and criminal tax law and the division of responsibility between the adviser (A) and client (C). It concludes, among other things, that there are judgements on close and remote complicity in criminal tax law and that it is generally easier to prove close than remote complicity.

There are presumption rules that A and C have intent (e.g. if A and C agreed to commit the crime), gross negligence (e.g. where the person was in a deliberate error) or simple negligence (where the person made a particularly excusable error). There are at least 12 tax and/or duty criminal cases where A has been charged with gross negligence in an advisor case. A is subject to a strict imputability assessment, but in 27 cases in criminal tax law, the prosecution appears to have shown restraint in bringing charges against A, even though A, as a provider of assistance, gave erroneous advice to the liable party C, because A was either in a negative error of fact or a negative non-genuine error of law.

Chapter 8 deals with misconceptions, the assessment of evidence and the burden of proof in criminal tax law. It is shown that there is apparently only one conviction in criminal tax law in which D is sentenced for a putative offence (one unpublished conviction from 1971). D has the "real" burden of proof that D at the time of the offence made an intentional negative error of fact and/or a negative error of law in tax and/or fiscal criminal cases in relation to whether there should be taxation of income derived from foreign income, undeclared income and private interest income. D has a strict "reverse" burden of proof (false burden of proof) that D was in a wilful misrepresentation of fact or law when D has provided false information about deductions. Negative errors of fact and negative errors of law may be particularly excusable, so that the courts rule that simple negligence is not punishable. Case law shows that there is a negative error of law when, for example, D has misunderstood a substantive tax rule underlying the tax offence that determines whether an evasion has occurred, and that in dubio pro reo applies to both errors of fact and errors of law.

Based on the case law analyses in chapters 3-8, the overall conclusion to the research questions is that, based on case law, it is possible to establish presumption rules for which elements of evidence the courts emphasise when deciding evasion is caused by an imputation of intent, gross negligence or simple negligence, and that presumption rules apply to the imputation assessment when D had failed to ensure compliance with a relevant rule at the time of the offence. According to the circumstances, D is guilty of intent if D deliberately failed to take precautions against breaking the law, gross negligence if D should have taken precautions against breaking the law and simple negligence if D was making a particularly excusable error of fact and/or law.

Chapter 9 "Comparative law" examines selected relevant issues in Swedish, Norwegian and Danish law and case law. Among other things, it is concluded that intent in the form of hypothetical intent (D has realised the realisation of the content of the offence as possible, and the court assumes that D would have acted as happened if D had had certain knowledge that the offence would occur) is applicable in Danish law, but not in Swedish and Norwegian law.

Chapter 10 describes the overall conclusions and perspectives of the paper.

 

Bedømmelsesudvalg

  • Lektor, Frank Högholm Pedersen
  • Lektor, Lene Wacher Lentz
  • Førsteamanuensis, institutleder, Eivind Furuseth

Vejleder 

  • Professor Thomas Elholm, Det Juridiske Fakultet, Københavns Universitet
  • (Bivejleder) Professor, dr.jur. Jan Pedersen, Juridisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet 

Efter forsvaret afholder Tommy og Det Juridiske Fakultet reception i foran lokale 27.0.17, Njalsgade 136, stuen, 2300 København S. Receptionen slutter kl. 18.00.

Afhandlingen kan bestilles ved henvendelse til phd-forsvar@jur.ku.dk.

Forsvaret afholdes på dansk.