Strategic Self-Ignorance
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- Strategic Self-Ignorance
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We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals — a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Lund |
Publisher | Department of Economics, Lund University |
Number of pages | 37 |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Series | Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University |
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Number | 2013:17 |
- Faculty of Social Sciences - Experiment, INFORMATION, Ignorance
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ID: 51506967