Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 119 |
Issue number | 3 |
Pages (from-to) | 261–263 |
Number of pages | 3 |
ISSN | 0165-1765 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2013 |
Bibliographical note
JEL classification: D82
- Faculty of Social Sciences - Full implementation, Direct mechanism, Verifiable information, Rank-order tournaments
Research areas
ID: 96089284