Electorally unstable by supply or demand? an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies
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Electorally unstable by supply or demand? an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies. / Bischoff, Carina Saxlund.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 156, No. 3-4, 09.2013, p. 537-561.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Electorally unstable by supply or demand?
T2 - an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies
AU - Bischoff, Carina Saxlund
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - The stability of voters’ partisan choices from election to election is a key feature of democratic politics, but why it varies across advanced industrial democracies and elections is not well understood. This study makes several key contributions to explaining electoral volatility. Firstly, it is argued and demonstrated that strategic voting plays an independent role in inducing vote switching. Secondly, the analysis shows that demand-side factors—such as socio-economic cleavages and organizations—do not predict voter stability, whereas supply-side factors—such as the party system, government performance, and strategic incentives—do. Thirdly, earlier contradictory findings with respect to the role of the electoral system are clarified, as its effects are shown to be indirect rather than direct. And finally, the importance of the temporal dimension to stability is demonstrated, as the time since the previous election is found to have a positive effect on volatility. The results are based on a comprehensive statistical analysis of 336 elections in 21 countries between 1950–2005, where the significance as well as the robustness of individual variables across different model specifications inform the conclusions
AB - The stability of voters’ partisan choices from election to election is a key feature of democratic politics, but why it varies across advanced industrial democracies and elections is not well understood. This study makes several key contributions to explaining electoral volatility. Firstly, it is argued and demonstrated that strategic voting plays an independent role in inducing vote switching. Secondly, the analysis shows that demand-side factors—such as socio-economic cleavages and organizations—do not predict voter stability, whereas supply-side factors—such as the party system, government performance, and strategic incentives—do. Thirdly, earlier contradictory findings with respect to the role of the electoral system are clarified, as its effects are shown to be indirect rather than direct. And finally, the importance of the temporal dimension to stability is demonstrated, as the time since the previous election is found to have a positive effect on volatility. The results are based on a comprehensive statistical analysis of 336 elections in 21 countries between 1950–2005, where the significance as well as the robustness of individual variables across different model specifications inform the conclusions
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Vælger skift
KW - Electoral volatility
KW - Strategic voting
KW - Party system
KW - Cleavages
KW - Government performance
KW - Electoral system
U2 - 10.1007/s11127-011-9910-z
DO - 10.1007/s11127-011-9910-z
M3 - Journal article
VL - 156
SP - 537
EP - 561
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 3-4
ER -
ID: 33640386