Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?
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Persuasion Bias in Science : Can Economics Help? / Di Tillio, Alfredo; Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman.
In: Economic Journal, Vol. 127, No. 605, 01.10.2017, p. F266-F304.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Persuasion Bias in Science
T2 - Can Economics Help?
AU - Di Tillio, Alfredo
AU - Ottaviani, Marco
AU - Sørensen, Peter Norman
PY - 2017/10/1
Y1 - 2017/10/1
N2 - We investigate the impact of conflicts of interests on randomised controlled trials in a game-theoretic framework. A researcher seeks to persuade an evaluator that the causal effect of a treatment outweighs its cost, to justify acceptance. The researcher can use private information to manipulate the experiment in three alternative ways: (i) sampling subjects based on their treatment effect, (ii) assigning subjects to treatment based on their baseline outcome, or (iii) selectively reporting experimental outcomes. The resulting biases have different welfare implications: for sufficiently high acceptance cost, in our binary illustration the evaluator loses in cases (i) and (iii) but benefits in case (ii).
AB - We investigate the impact of conflicts of interests on randomised controlled trials in a game-theoretic framework. A researcher seeks to persuade an evaluator that the causal effect of a treatment outweighs its cost, to justify acceptance. The researcher can use private information to manipulate the experiment in three alternative ways: (i) sampling subjects based on their treatment effect, (ii) assigning subjects to treatment based on their baseline outcome, or (iii) selectively reporting experimental outcomes. The resulting biases have different welfare implications: for sufficiently high acceptance cost, in our binary illustration the evaluator loses in cases (i) and (iii) but benefits in case (ii).
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Randomised controlled trials
KW - Strategic selection
KW - Welfare
KW - D82
KW - D83C10
KW - C90
U2 - 10.1111/ecoj.12515
DO - 10.1111/ecoj.12515
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85032354093
VL - 127
SP - F266-F304
JO - The Economic Journal
JF - The Economic Journal
SN - 0013-0133
IS - 605
ER -
ID: 188112158