Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection
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Choosing a public-spirited leader : An experimental investigation of political selection. / Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-robert.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 144, 01.12.2017, p. 204-218.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Choosing a public-spirited leader
T2 - An experimental investigation of political selection
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Tyran, Jean-robert
PY - 2017/12/1
Y1 - 2017/12/1
N2 - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
AB - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Political selection
KW - Pro-social behavior
KW - Social dilemma
KW - Corruption
KW - Voting
KW - C92
KW - C91
KW - D03
KW - D72
KW - H41
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006
M3 - Journal article
VL - 144
SP - 204
EP - 218
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -
ID: 186156349