Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality
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Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.
In: Avant, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2020, p. 1-22.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality
AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’
AB - This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Intentionality
KW - individuality
KW - intersubjectivity
KW - normativity
KW - collectivity
KW - autonomy
KW - authority
KW - inferentialism
U2 - 10.26913/avant.2020.02.12
DO - 10.26913/avant.2020.02.12
M3 - Journal article
VL - 11
SP - 1
EP - 22
JO - Avant
JF - Avant
SN - 2082-6710
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 333305291