Praetorius, N. (2007) The Problems of Consciousness and Content in Theories of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:349-367

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  • Perception

    Final published version, 273 KB, PDF document

The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s SensorimotorTheory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidencefrom empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidatestheir theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory ofvision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’sand Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutuallyconflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paperconcludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions forpsychological theories of perception.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume6
Pages (from-to)349-367
ISSN1568-7759
Publication statusPublished - 2007

    Research areas

  • Faculty of Humanities - sensorimotor theory of vision.enactive perception.dualism.Noë.O’Regan

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