Moore's paradox and epistemic norms

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.
Original languageEnglish
JournalLogos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology
Volume5
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)445
Number of pages464
ISSN2069-0533
Publication statusPublished - 2014

ID: 333304632