Moore's paradox and epistemic norms

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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

In: Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2014, p. 445.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2014, 'Moore's paradox and epistemic norms', Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 445.

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2014). Moore's paradox and epistemic norms. Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology, 5(4), 445.

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Moore's paradox and epistemic norms. Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology. 2014;5(4):445.

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Moore's paradox and epistemic norms. In: Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology. 2014 ; Vol. 5, No. 4. pp. 445.

Bibtex

@article{c0ca8b5dcbc14d01adb13b9916a1784f,
title = "Moore's paradox and epistemic norms",
abstract = "Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn{\textquoteright}t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn{\textquoteright}t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Moore's paradox, epistemic norms, normative explanation, absurdity",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
pages = "445",
journal = "Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology",
issn = "2069-0533",
publisher = "Institutul European",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Moore's paradox and epistemic norms

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.

AB - Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Moore's paradox

KW - epistemic norms

KW - normative explanation

KW - absurdity

M3 - Journal article

VL - 5

SP - 445

JO - Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology

JF - Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of Epistemology

SN - 2069-0533

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 333304632