Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Standard

Husserl on Collective Intentionality. / Szanto, Thomas.

The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality : History, Concepts, Problems. ed. / Alessandro Salice; Hans Bernhard Schmid. Cham : Springer, 2016. p. 145-172 (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol. 6).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Szanto, T 2016, Husserl on Collective Intentionality. in A Salice & HB Schmid (eds), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality : History, Concepts, Problems. Springer, Cham, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol. 6, pp. 145-172. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

APA

Szanto, T. (2016). Husserl on Collective Intentionality. In A. Salice, & H. B. Schmid (Eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality : History, Concepts, Problems (pp. 145-172). Cham: Springer. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol.. 6 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

Vancouver

Szanto T. Husserl on Collective Intentionality. In Salice A, Schmid HB, editors, The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality : History, Concepts, Problems. Cham: Springer. 2016. p. 145-172. (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol. 6). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

Author

Szanto, Thomas. / Husserl on Collective Intentionality. The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality : History, Concepts, Problems. editor / Alessandro Salice ; Hans Bernhard Schmid. Cham : Springer, 2016. pp. 145-172 (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol. 6).

Bibtex

@inbook{38b5e12b800448fda69fd903ab681896,
title = "Husserl on Collective Intentionality",
abstract = "Unlike Husserl’s theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, his theory of collective intentionality has hardly been studied. In this paper, I shall address this neglected but important aspect of his phenomenology. I will argue that Husserl’s contribution, on closer scrutiny, not only stands on an equal footing with contemporary analytic accounts but, indeed, helps to alleviate some of their shortcomings. In particular, I will elaborate on the differences in the social integration of individuals and collectives in terms of intersubjective, social, communal and collective intentionality, respectively. On this background, I will concentrate on Husserl’s alternative construal and demonstrate how it entails a robust anti-individualism regarding both the form and the subject of we-intentions. I will suggest that, contrary to appearances, Husserl does not fall prey to committing a content/vehicle type of fallacy, by inferring from the jointness of the contents of collective intentionality that there is one joint vehicle or, worse, some collectively conscious bearer of such. Rather, the Husserlian alternative yields a robust formal-cum-subject anti-individualism and undercuts the need for deciding between tying in collectivity with either the subject, the mode, or the content of collective intentionality. Ultimately, I wish to show that Husserlian phenomenology allows for a multi-layered and distinctively intentionalist description of communalization, a program often pointed to but, in fact, little expounded upon in contemporary social ontology",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Collective intentionality, Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, Intersubjectivity, Social ontology",
author = "Thomas Szanto",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-319-27691-5",
series = "Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "145--172",
editor = "Alessandro Salice and Schmid, {Hans Bernhard}",
booktitle = "The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Husserl on Collective Intentionality

AU - Szanto, Thomas

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Unlike Husserl’s theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, his theory of collective intentionality has hardly been studied. In this paper, I shall address this neglected but important aspect of his phenomenology. I will argue that Husserl’s contribution, on closer scrutiny, not only stands on an equal footing with contemporary analytic accounts but, indeed, helps to alleviate some of their shortcomings. In particular, I will elaborate on the differences in the social integration of individuals and collectives in terms of intersubjective, social, communal and collective intentionality, respectively. On this background, I will concentrate on Husserl’s alternative construal and demonstrate how it entails a robust anti-individualism regarding both the form and the subject of we-intentions. I will suggest that, contrary to appearances, Husserl does not fall prey to committing a content/vehicle type of fallacy, by inferring from the jointness of the contents of collective intentionality that there is one joint vehicle or, worse, some collectively conscious bearer of such. Rather, the Husserlian alternative yields a robust formal-cum-subject anti-individualism and undercuts the need for deciding between tying in collectivity with either the subject, the mode, or the content of collective intentionality. Ultimately, I wish to show that Husserlian phenomenology allows for a multi-layered and distinctively intentionalist description of communalization, a program often pointed to but, in fact, little expounded upon in contemporary social ontology

AB - Unlike Husserl’s theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, his theory of collective intentionality has hardly been studied. In this paper, I shall address this neglected but important aspect of his phenomenology. I will argue that Husserl’s contribution, on closer scrutiny, not only stands on an equal footing with contemporary analytic accounts but, indeed, helps to alleviate some of their shortcomings. In particular, I will elaborate on the differences in the social integration of individuals and collectives in terms of intersubjective, social, communal and collective intentionality, respectively. On this background, I will concentrate on Husserl’s alternative construal and demonstrate how it entails a robust anti-individualism regarding both the form and the subject of we-intentions. I will suggest that, contrary to appearances, Husserl does not fall prey to committing a content/vehicle type of fallacy, by inferring from the jointness of the contents of collective intentionality that there is one joint vehicle or, worse, some collectively conscious bearer of such. Rather, the Husserlian alternative yields a robust formal-cum-subject anti-individualism and undercuts the need for deciding between tying in collectivity with either the subject, the mode, or the content of collective intentionality. Ultimately, I wish to show that Husserlian phenomenology allows for a multi-layered and distinctively intentionalist description of communalization, a program often pointed to but, in fact, little expounded upon in contemporary social ontology

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Collective intentionality

KW - Edmund Husserl

KW - Phenomenology

KW - Intersubjectivity

KW - Social ontology

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_7

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-3-319-27691-5

T3 - Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

SP - 145

EP - 172

BT - The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality

A2 - Salice, Alessandro

A2 - Schmid, Hans Bernhard

PB - Springer

CY - Cham

ER -

ID: 111296556