Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics. / Henriksen, Mads Gram; Parnas, Josef.

In: Thaumazein, Vol. 7, 2019, p. 6-20.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Henriksen, MG & Parnas, J 2019, 'Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics', Thaumazein, vol. 7, pp. 6-20.

APA

Henriksen, M. G., & Parnas, J. (2019). Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics. Thaumazein, 7, 6-20.

Vancouver

Henriksen MG, Parnas J. Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics. Thaumazein. 2019;7:6-20.

Author

Henriksen, Mads Gram ; Parnas, Josef. / Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics. In: Thaumazein. 2019 ; Vol. 7. pp. 6-20.

Bibtex

@article{5fa1ba2c426d43cc83fca80017e560c3,
title = "Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics",
abstract = "In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the natureof the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personallymanifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way inwhich they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challengedthis claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting theclaim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three allegedcounter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology andpsychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refutethem all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable featureof phenomenal consciousness.",
author = "Henriksen, {Mads Gram} and Josef Parnas",
year = "2019",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "6--20",
journal = "Thaumazein",
issn = "1982-2103",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics

AU - Henriksen, Mads Gram

AU - Parnas, Josef

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the natureof the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personallymanifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way inwhich they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challengedthis claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting theclaim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three allegedcounter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology andpsychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refutethem all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable featureof phenomenal consciousness.

AB - In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the natureof the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personallymanifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way inwhich they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challengedthis claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting theclaim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three allegedcounter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology andpsychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refutethem all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable featureof phenomenal consciousness.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 6

EP - 20

JO - Thaumazein

JF - Thaumazein

SN - 1982-2103

ER -

ID: 222248251