¿Por qué los autócratas limitan judicialmente su poder? Un análisis comparado del establecimiento de altos tribunales en regímenes autoritarios
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The article studies comparatively the decision of the autocrats to establish or preserve high courts, analysing under which conditions they tolerate judicial institutions able to limit and review their power. Through the statistical analysis of new data on autocracies between 1972 and 2002 and case studies, the article analyses how autocrats are more prone to allow high courts in context where there is a powerful political opposition than in countries where the elite is cohesive. This ensures that these courts legitimize those decisions susceptible to generate dissent and avoid that the opposition capitalize controversial political issues that could threat the regime.
Translated title of the contribution | Why do autocrats place legal constraints on their power? |
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Original language | Spanish |
Journal | Revista de Estudios Politicos |
Issue number | 158 |
Pages (from-to) | 41-74 |
Number of pages | 34 |
ISSN | 0048-7694 |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
ID: 276397244