Debates about the ethics of moral bioenhancement (MBE) have generated legitimate worries about the moral permissibility of MBE. In particular, commentators sceptical of MBE have focused on claims about MBE as hindering authenticity and freedom, as unnecessary or superfluous for moral progress, as exacerbating moral disagreement, and as running the risk of moral authoritarianism. While I do not endorse a strong position in favour of MBE, I argue that some of this scepticism can be countered. First, I address the question of authenticity and freedom. I draw from debates about the integrity objection to utilitarianism to make light of the idea that the value placed on authenticity is exaggerated. I also claim that MBE is not any more problematic for freedom than more traditional methods of moral enhancement. In my view, the emphasis on loss of authenticity and freedom is bound up in an individualistic and masculinized narrative about valuable traits in persons, which neglects the more communal values that may motivate a project like MBE. Second, even if MBE is not necessary for people to recognize and act on problems that need fixing in the world, MBE may nevertheless be desirable to the extent that it promotes greater efficacy in projects that aim for moral improvement. Next, I claim that the issue of moral disagreement is overstated. While disagreement exists, so does moral consensus: and this is often embodied in the ongoing grievances in groups of individuals who materially suffer by the wrongs and oppressions of others. Thus, the problem of moral disagreement in my view fails to constitute a sensible reason to bar MBE. Lastly, I claim that the objection from moral authoritarianism is misplaced, since states are already implicated in policies that subject individuals to varying degrees of ‘moral perfectionism’. The issue, then, is about justifying, and getting clear on, the realms of individual lives over which the state has the authority to control or interfere, rather than it being a problem about the permissibility of MBE in particular. I conclude that while other concerns about the development and implementation of MBE may count as reasons against advocating MBE, the objections addressed above turn out to be weaker than they first appear.