This paper purposes to analyse from a comparative approach the constitutional norms ruling the system of appointment and proposal of judges of constitutional courts. Through the analysis of this set of norms the resolution of various constitutional and political issues is intended, especially those related with the principle of independence, impartiality and the representativeness of the judges. The first objective of this essay is to determine whether sub-state entities develop some kind of role in the process of composition of the different constitutional courts; and if so, whether this influence is determinant or not in the constitutional sphere. The study begins with the Court of Constitutional Guarantees of the Spanish Second Republic and follows up with diverse exiting constitutional frameworks in federal and unitary states based on the classification proposed by the Venice Commission in its report on the composition of constitutional courts. Finally, it is tested if the territorial nature of the state is crucial in order to include the geographic and demographic criteria into the appointment process and the composition of the courts that control the constitutionality of acts with force of law.