




Standards for the Cyber Resilience Act

Filipe Jones Mourao, policy officer

European Commission, DG CONNECT

Global context




CRA in a nutshell



Main elements of the proposal

- ❖ **Cybersecurity rules** for the placing on the market of hardware and software
- ❖ Based on **New Legislative Framework** (well-established EU product-related legislative setting)
- ❖ **Obligations** for manufacturers, distributors and importers
- ❖ Cybersecurity **essential requirements** across the life cycle
- ❖ Harmonised **standards** to follow
- ❖ **Conformity assessment** – differentiated by level of risk
- ❖ **Market surveillance and enforcement**

CE marking



Scope

Products with digital elements:

- + **Hardware products** and components placed on the market separately, such as laptops, smart appliances, mobile phones, network equipment or CPUs
- + **Software products** and components placed on the market separately, such as operating systems, word processing, games or mobile apps
- ① The definition of “**products with digital elements**” also includes **remote data processing solutions**.

Not covered:

- ✗ **Non-commercial projects, including open source** in so far as a project is not part of a commercial activity
- ✗ **Services, in particular standalone Software-as-a-Service** – *covered by NIS2*

Outright exclusions:

- ✗ **Certain products sufficiently regulated on cybersecurity** (cars, medical devices, *in vitro*, certified aeronautical equipment, marine equipment)

Approach to open-source

- Only **directly monetised** open-source products subject to full set of obligations
- Introduction of the **open-source software steward**:
Light-touch approach for organisations that do not directly monetise but support on a sustained basis the development of specific open-source products intended for commercial activities.
- **Possibility of self-assessment** for open-source products, irrespective of whether they are considered important products or not
- **Obligation for integrators** to provide maintainers of open-source components with available fixes.

Obligations of manufacturers

Assessment of the risks associated with a product

- (1) **Product-related** essential requirements (Annex I, Part I)
- (2) **Vulnerability handling** essential requirements (Annex 1, Part II)
- (3) **Technical file, including information and instructions** for use (Annex II + V)

Conformity assessment, CE marking, EU Declaration of Conformity (Annex IV)

Continued compliance with **vulnerability handling** essential requirements throughout the product lifetime (Annex I, Part II)

Design and
development
phase

Maintenance phase

Obligation to report through a single reporting platform:

- (1) **actively exploited vulnerabilities**
- (2) **incidents** having an impact on the security of the product

Reporting
obligations
to continue

Cybersecurity Essential Requirements

Properties of products

- ❖ No known exploitable vulnerabilities
- ❖ Security updatability (automatic)
- ❖ Access control (authentication)
- ❖ Confidentiality, Integrity, Accessibility (encryption)
- ❖ Data minimisation (intended purpose)
- ❖ Resilience of functions (DDoS)
- ❖ Reduce attack surface (interfaces)
- ❖ Reduce impact of incident (mitigation)
- ❖ Monitoring and logging (opt-out)
- ❖ Secure erasure

Vulnerability handling

- ❖ Identify components (SBOM)
- ❖ Document vulnerabilities
- ❖ Mitigate without delay
- ❖ Regular test and review
- ❖ Publicly disclose information once fixed
- ❖ Coordinated vulnerability disclosure
- ❖ Share information on potential vulnerabilities
- ❖ Securely distribute updates
- ❖ Disseminate updates free of charge

Software Bill of Materials in the CRA

- ❖ **Manufacturers to draw up a SBOM** in a commonly used format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies of the product
- ❖ **No requirement** to make the SBOM publicly available
- ❖ SBOM to be included in the **technical documentation** and, upon request, to be provided to **market surveillance authorities**
- ❖ **Commission empowerment** to specify the format and elements (international standards to be relied upon)


Conformity assessment – risk categorisation

- **Default category (more than 90%):** The vast majority of products will be subject to self-assessment (examples: photo editing, word processing, smart speakers, hard drives, games etc.)
- **Important products (less than 10%):** A small group of critical products listed in the Annex will be subject to *more stringent conformity assessment procedures*, including assessment by an independent third party (examples: firewalls, routers, hypervisors etc.)
- **Critical products:** To future-proof the CRA, the Commission is empowered to adopt secondary legislation requiring *mandatory certification* based on EU cybersecurity certification schemes (Cybersecurity Act) of certain products posing a particularly high risk, such as smart cards.


A simplified example of smartphones

As a rule, whoever places on the market a “final” product or a component is required to comply with the **essential requirements**, undergo **conformity assessment** and affix the **CE marking**.

Developed by the manufacturer placing the smartphone on the market:



Developed by upstream manufacturers for integration into the “final” product:



Placed on the market separately for users to buy and integrate:




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Market surveillance powers and sanctions

- ❖ Tools for checks at the disposal of market surveillance authorities (MSAs): documentary checks, requests for information, inspections, laboratory checks etc.
- ❖ **When non-compliance found**, MSAs have powers to:
 - 1) require **manufacturers to bring non-compliance to an end** and eliminate risk;
 - 2) to **prohibit/restrict the making available** of a product or to order that the product is **withdrawn/recalled**;
 - 3) impose **penalties** (including fines up to 15 000 000 EUR or up to 2.5 % of worldwide turnover).
- ❖ In exceptional circumstances, COM may require ENISA to conduct an evaluation and, based on the results, establish a **corrective or restrictive measure is necessary at Union level** via an Implementing Act (and following MS consultations).

Tentative timeline





Draft Standardisation Request
in support of the

Cyber Resilience Act

European Commission, DG CONNECT

Results of gap analysis

- ❖ No single standard covers all the requirements
- ❖ For each of the defined requirements there is already at least one reference document
- ❖ Good cybersecurity standardisation base is in place
- ❖ Harmonisation is needed to ensure a homogeneous horizontal coverage
- ❖ Some gaps need to be addressed

Draft Standardisation Request

❖ Policy-based Standardisation Request

- ❖ Aim to gain time and allow technical discussions to start as soon as feasible
- ❖ Amend the Request once CRA is finally adopted

❖ Targeted stakeholder consultations

- ❖ ESOs, Annex III orgs.
- ❖ Expert Group: Multi-stakeholder Platform on ICT standardisation

Draft Standardisation Request

❖ **Proposed approach:**

- ❖ Building on existing international standards and work done for RED DA (“horizontal” approach)
- ❖ 2-tiered approach with horizontal and vertical standards, prioritising important / critical products (CRA Annex III).
- ❖ Possible inspiration: machine safety Type A, B, C standards
- ❖ 41 European standards plus supporting deliverables (if any)
- ❖ First building blocks for product security ecosystem of standards

Next steps

- ❖ Public notification of CRA SR (open until 16 May 2024)
- ❖ Possible Action Grant to support NSBs and ESOs
- ❖ Adoption of request, acceptance, start of development
- ❖ Policy-based SR to be amended once CRA is fully adopted
- ❖ **Medium term:** market-led development of more product-specific standards (type C), to propose to COM for harmonisation

Thank you.