‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Standard

‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. / Holtermann, Jakob v. H.

The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. ed. / Nobuo Hayashi; Cecilia M. Bailliet. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 206-227.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Holtermann, JVH 2017, ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. in N Hayashi & CM Bailliet (eds), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 206-227. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316536469.009

APA

Holtermann, J. V. H. (2017). ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. In N. Hayashi, & C. M. Bailliet (Eds.), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (pp. 206-227). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316536469.009

Vancouver

Holtermann JVH. ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. In Hayashi N, Bailliet CM, editors, The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2017. p. 206-227 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316536469.009

Author

Holtermann, Jakob v. H. / ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’? On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals. editor / Nobuo Hayashi ; Cecilia M. Bailliet. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017. pp. 206-227

Bibtex

@inbook{498988f1b4964adcb4e3ba219f9b2ba6,
title = "‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’?: On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals",
abstract = "International criminal tribunals (ICTs) are epistemic engines in the sense that they find (or claim to find) factual truths about such past events that qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The value of this kind of knowledge would seem to be beyond dispute. Yet, in general the truth-finding aspect of ICTs plays only a very limited role in the often heated debates about their legitimacy. Furthermore, those who actually do address the issue seem widely divided as to whether critiques of the epistemic function of ICTs in fact constitute, in Andreas F{\o}llesdal’s words, one of ‘the challenges that can plausibly be raised against them’ – and if so, in what ways. In this paper, I address the first of these questions asking whether truth-finding should at all be considered a desideratum for ICTs. To this end, I discuss the widespread claim that it should not because the legal truth found in ICT judgements is in fact sui generis; i.e. something categorically different from ordinary truth because exclusively tied to and determined by the legal process as defined in accordance with ideals of due process/fair trial. I argue that this position is ill-founded. Properly understood, truth in law is intimately connected to ordinary truth. Truth-finding capacity therefore does belong in legitimacy debates as a challenge that can plausibly be raised against them. This, in turn makes it relevant, in future research, to map, analyse and interrelate the various critiques that have been launched against the actual truth conduciveness of ICTs.",
keywords = "Faculty of Law, Den Internationale Straffedomstol, Legitimitet, sandhed, sandhedskommission, sandhed i retten, retsfilosofi, Kleist (Heinrich von), Bourdieu, Pierre, International Criminal Court, truth, truth and reconciliation, Truth Commissions, legal epistemology, legal truth, Kleist (Heinrich von), Bourdieu, Pierre, legitimacy",
author = "Holtermann, {Jakob v. H.}",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1017/9781316536469.009",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781107146174",
pages = "206--227",
editor = "Nobuo Hayashi and Bailliet, {Cecilia M.}",
booktitle = "The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - ‘One of the Challenges that Can Plausibly Be Raised Against Them’?

T2 - On the Role of Truth in Debates about the Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals

AU - Holtermann, Jakob v. H.

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - International criminal tribunals (ICTs) are epistemic engines in the sense that they find (or claim to find) factual truths about such past events that qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The value of this kind of knowledge would seem to be beyond dispute. Yet, in general the truth-finding aspect of ICTs plays only a very limited role in the often heated debates about their legitimacy. Furthermore, those who actually do address the issue seem widely divided as to whether critiques of the epistemic function of ICTs in fact constitute, in Andreas Føllesdal’s words, one of ‘the challenges that can plausibly be raised against them’ – and if so, in what ways. In this paper, I address the first of these questions asking whether truth-finding should at all be considered a desideratum for ICTs. To this end, I discuss the widespread claim that it should not because the legal truth found in ICT judgements is in fact sui generis; i.e. something categorically different from ordinary truth because exclusively tied to and determined by the legal process as defined in accordance with ideals of due process/fair trial. I argue that this position is ill-founded. Properly understood, truth in law is intimately connected to ordinary truth. Truth-finding capacity therefore does belong in legitimacy debates as a challenge that can plausibly be raised against them. This, in turn makes it relevant, in future research, to map, analyse and interrelate the various critiques that have been launched against the actual truth conduciveness of ICTs.

AB - International criminal tribunals (ICTs) are epistemic engines in the sense that they find (or claim to find) factual truths about such past events that qualify as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The value of this kind of knowledge would seem to be beyond dispute. Yet, in general the truth-finding aspect of ICTs plays only a very limited role in the often heated debates about their legitimacy. Furthermore, those who actually do address the issue seem widely divided as to whether critiques of the epistemic function of ICTs in fact constitute, in Andreas Føllesdal’s words, one of ‘the challenges that can plausibly be raised against them’ – and if so, in what ways. In this paper, I address the first of these questions asking whether truth-finding should at all be considered a desideratum for ICTs. To this end, I discuss the widespread claim that it should not because the legal truth found in ICT judgements is in fact sui generis; i.e. something categorically different from ordinary truth because exclusively tied to and determined by the legal process as defined in accordance with ideals of due process/fair trial. I argue that this position is ill-founded. Properly understood, truth in law is intimately connected to ordinary truth. Truth-finding capacity therefore does belong in legitimacy debates as a challenge that can plausibly be raised against them. This, in turn makes it relevant, in future research, to map, analyse and interrelate the various critiques that have been launched against the actual truth conduciveness of ICTs.

KW - Faculty of Law

KW - Den Internationale Straffedomstol

KW - Legitimitet

KW - sandhed

KW - sandhedskommission

KW - sandhed i retten

KW - retsfilosofi

KW - Kleist (Heinrich von)

KW - Bourdieu, Pierre

KW - International Criminal Court

KW - truth

KW - truth and reconciliation

KW - Truth Commissions

KW - legal epistemology

KW - legal truth

KW - Kleist (Heinrich von)

KW - Bourdieu, Pierre

KW - legitimacy

UR - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692994

U2 - 10.1017/9781316536469.009

DO - 10.1017/9781316536469.009

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 9781107146174

SP - 206

EP - 227

BT - The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals

A2 - Hayashi, Nobuo

A2 - Bailliet, Cecilia M.

PB - Cambridge University Press

CY - Cambridge

ER -

ID: 147974419