Other minds embodied

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I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.
Original languageEnglish
JournalContinental Philosophy Review
Volume50
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)65-80
Number of pages16
ISSN1387-2842
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

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