Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Coordination problems in cryptomarkets : Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation. / Bakken, Silje Anderdal; Møller, Kim; Sandberg, Sveinung.

In: European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 12.2017, p. 442-460.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Bakken, SA, Møller, K & Sandberg, S 2017, 'Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation', European Journal of Criminology, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 442-460. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370817749177

APA

Bakken, S. A., Møller, K., & Sandberg, S. (2017). Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation. European Journal of Criminology, 15(4), 442-460. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370817749177

Vancouver

Bakken SA, Møller K, Sandberg S. Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation. European Journal of Criminology. 2017 Dec;15(4):442-460. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370817749177

Author

Bakken, Silje Anderdal ; Møller, Kim ; Sandberg, Sveinung. / Coordination problems in cryptomarkets : Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation. In: European Journal of Criminology. 2017 ; Vol. 15, No. 4. pp. 442-460.

Bibtex

@article{97772f8da0ae488984237e9b2cd721d2,
title = "Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation",
abstract = "The new drug markets emerging on the dark net have reduced earlier drug market risk factors such as visibility and violence. This study uses economic sociology and transaction cost economics to broaden the present understanding of cryptomarkets. Results focus on three coordination problems characterizing illegal markets and how they are alleviated in cryptomarkets. More information and better visibility increase competition, the feedback system enforces cooperation and border control introduces a new cost influencing valuation. Cryptomarkets are formally structured and regulated by rules of conduct and centralized decisions. We argue that the online context circumvents earlier coordination problems in illegal markets, making dark net markets more structurally efficient compared with conventional drug markets.",
keywords = "Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences, cryptomarkets, Economical sociology, Cryptomarket, dark net, drug market, economic sociology, illegal drugs, transaction cost, economics",
author = "Bakken, {Silje Anderdal} and Kim M{\o}ller and Sveinung Sandberg",
year = "2017",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1177/1477370817749177",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "442--460",
journal = "European Journal of Criminology",
issn = "1477-3708",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coordination problems in cryptomarkets

T2 - Changes in cooperation, competition, and valuation

AU - Bakken, Silje Anderdal

AU - Møller, Kim

AU - Sandberg, Sveinung

PY - 2017/12

Y1 - 2017/12

N2 - The new drug markets emerging on the dark net have reduced earlier drug market risk factors such as visibility and violence. This study uses economic sociology and transaction cost economics to broaden the present understanding of cryptomarkets. Results focus on three coordination problems characterizing illegal markets and how they are alleviated in cryptomarkets. More information and better visibility increase competition, the feedback system enforces cooperation and border control introduces a new cost influencing valuation. Cryptomarkets are formally structured and regulated by rules of conduct and centralized decisions. We argue that the online context circumvents earlier coordination problems in illegal markets, making dark net markets more structurally efficient compared with conventional drug markets.

AB - The new drug markets emerging on the dark net have reduced earlier drug market risk factors such as visibility and violence. This study uses economic sociology and transaction cost economics to broaden the present understanding of cryptomarkets. Results focus on three coordination problems characterizing illegal markets and how they are alleviated in cryptomarkets. More information and better visibility increase competition, the feedback system enforces cooperation and border control introduces a new cost influencing valuation. Cryptomarkets are formally structured and regulated by rules of conduct and centralized decisions. We argue that the online context circumvents earlier coordination problems in illegal markets, making dark net markets more structurally efficient compared with conventional drug markets.

KW - Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences

KW - cryptomarkets

KW - Economical sociology

KW - Cryptomarket

KW - dark net

KW - drug market

KW - economic sociology

KW - illegal drugs

KW - transaction cost

KW - economics

U2 - 10.1177/1477370817749177

DO - 10.1177/1477370817749177

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 442

EP - 460

JO - European Journal of Criminology

JF - European Journal of Criminology

SN - 1477-3708

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 208856730