The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Documents

States have a significant influence on the selection of judges to international courts. This raises the concern that judges will be biased in favor of their home states, a concern backed by some empirical research. To counter that danger, international courts usually sit in large and diverse panels. Scholars have argued that this gives judges only rare occasions to tip the balance in favor of their home states. The problem begins, however, when judges start forming coalitions among themselves, giving judges with national biases a practical possibility to change the result of cases. To assess the magnitude of this threat to judicial independence, the paper draws on decades of scholarship in the field of judicial behavior. By understanding how judges behave, scholars can come closer to deciphering the true impact of judicial selection to international courts on international judgments.
Original languageEnglish
JournalGerman Law Journal
Volume19
Issue number7
Pages (from-to)2165-2188
Number of pages24
ISSN2071-8322
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Number of downloads are based on statistics from Google Scholar and www.ku.dk


No data available

ID: 198110082