The removal of organs for the purpose of transplantation involves damaging a human body in order to save another person. This intervention calls for an analysis of the interactions between the donor and the awaiting patient’s fundamental rights within organ donation norms. Born at the same time in the United States and in Europe, organ transplantation has to deal with the same challenges nowadays, in spaces based on the free movement of persons and goods. The objective is to identify and compare the fundamental rights of the living and deceased organ donor, in Europe and in the United States, and to analyze their interactions with the potential recipient’s rights. The thesis argues that living organ donation norms ensure a convergence of those rights by promoting a solidarian autonomy, despite some limitations. On the other hand, deceased organ donation norms have a hard time to ensure a balance of rights, either because some rights cannot be the objet of a compromise or because the rights are shared between the deceased person, the State and the deceased’s relatives.

Keywords : fundamental rights, transplantation, donor, recipient, autonomy, solidarity, disposal, dead person, human body, next of kin, public interest, morals, United States, European Union, Council of Europe, United States Supreme Court, European Court of Human Rights, normative interactions