Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations. / Creamer, Cosette; Godzimirska, Zuzanna.

In: New York University Journal of International Law & Politics , Vol. 48, No. 2, 2016, p. 413-462.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Creamer, C & Godzimirska, Z 2016, 'Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations', New York University Journal of International Law & Politics , vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 413-462.

APA

Creamer, C., & Godzimirska, Z. (2016). Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations. New York University Journal of International Law & Politics , 48(2), 413-462.

Vancouver

Creamer C, Godzimirska Z. Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations. New York University Journal of International Law & Politics . 2016;48(2):413-462.

Author

Creamer, Cosette ; Godzimirska, Zuzanna. / Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations. In: New York University Journal of International Law & Politics . 2016 ; Vol. 48, No. 2. pp. 413-462.

Bibtex

@article{67782b9ea6ff4666a980451b8072cbeb,
title = "Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations",
abstract = "The transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement proceedings to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) represented a notable instance of judicialization within international economic governance. Since it began ruling on trade conflicts in 1995, the DSM has enjoyed significantly greater independence from direct government control than its GATT predecessors. It has also exercised a greater degree of interpretive autonomy than initially intended by WTO member governments (Members). This development largely stems from deadlock among Members and norms of consensus decision-making, which have thwarted use of one of the primary means of legislative response within the WTO: authoritative interpretations. Authoritative interpretations theoretically provide the WTO’s political bodies—the membership as a whole—with an opportunity to respond to interpretations or practices of its adjudicative bodies that are perceived to be at odds with governments’ intention, will, or preferences. Yet the current ineffective nature of authoritative interpretations creates a predicament not only for the WTO’s political organs. It also deprives the DSM of constructive normative guidance from its primary constituents: its Members. This Article proposes a functional substitute for the mechanism of authoritative interpretations, namely increased input from Members (in the form of statements within meetings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) prior to adoption of the dispute settlement rulings. We argue that such an increase would better enable the DSM to consider the interpretive preferences of the WTO membership as a whole, thus enabling it to better fulfill its fiduciary duties and its responsibility of deliberative engagement with Members in particular. This Article specifies how the proposal would work in practice and addresses potential limitations and obstacles to its implementation.",
keywords = "Faculty of Law, deliberative engagement, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism",
author = "Cosette Creamer and Zuzanna Godzimirska",
note = "New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 48, Issue 2 (Winter 2016), pp. 413-462 Creamer, Cosette D.; Godzimirska, Zuzanna 48 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 413 (2015-2016)",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "413--462",
journal = "New York University Journal of International Law & Politics",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Deliberative Engagement within the World Trade Organization: A Functional Substitute for Authoritative Interpretations

AU - Creamer, Cosette

AU - Godzimirska, Zuzanna

N1 - New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 48, Issue 2 (Winter 2016), pp. 413-462 Creamer, Cosette D.; Godzimirska, Zuzanna 48 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 413 (2015-2016)

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - The transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement proceedings to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) represented a notable instance of judicialization within international economic governance. Since it began ruling on trade conflicts in 1995, the DSM has enjoyed significantly greater independence from direct government control than its GATT predecessors. It has also exercised a greater degree of interpretive autonomy than initially intended by WTO member governments (Members). This development largely stems from deadlock among Members and norms of consensus decision-making, which have thwarted use of one of the primary means of legislative response within the WTO: authoritative interpretations. Authoritative interpretations theoretically provide the WTO’s political bodies—the membership as a whole—with an opportunity to respond to interpretations or practices of its adjudicative bodies that are perceived to be at odds with governments’ intention, will, or preferences. Yet the current ineffective nature of authoritative interpretations creates a predicament not only for the WTO’s political organs. It also deprives the DSM of constructive normative guidance from its primary constituents: its Members. This Article proposes a functional substitute for the mechanism of authoritative interpretations, namely increased input from Members (in the form of statements within meetings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) prior to adoption of the dispute settlement rulings. We argue that such an increase would better enable the DSM to consider the interpretive preferences of the WTO membership as a whole, thus enabling it to better fulfill its fiduciary duties and its responsibility of deliberative engagement with Members in particular. This Article specifies how the proposal would work in practice and addresses potential limitations and obstacles to its implementation.

AB - The transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement proceedings to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) represented a notable instance of judicialization within international economic governance. Since it began ruling on trade conflicts in 1995, the DSM has enjoyed significantly greater independence from direct government control than its GATT predecessors. It has also exercised a greater degree of interpretive autonomy than initially intended by WTO member governments (Members). This development largely stems from deadlock among Members and norms of consensus decision-making, which have thwarted use of one of the primary means of legislative response within the WTO: authoritative interpretations. Authoritative interpretations theoretically provide the WTO’s political bodies—the membership as a whole—with an opportunity to respond to interpretations or practices of its adjudicative bodies that are perceived to be at odds with governments’ intention, will, or preferences. Yet the current ineffective nature of authoritative interpretations creates a predicament not only for the WTO’s political organs. It also deprives the DSM of constructive normative guidance from its primary constituents: its Members. This Article proposes a functional substitute for the mechanism of authoritative interpretations, namely increased input from Members (in the form of statements within meetings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) prior to adoption of the dispute settlement rulings. We argue that such an increase would better enable the DSM to consider the interpretive preferences of the WTO membership as a whole, thus enabling it to better fulfill its fiduciary duties and its responsibility of deliberative engagement with Members in particular. This Article specifies how the proposal would work in practice and addresses potential limitations and obstacles to its implementation.

KW - Faculty of Law

KW - deliberative engagement

KW - WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

M3 - Journal article

VL - 48

SP - 413

EP - 462

JO - New York University Journal of International Law & Politics

JF - New York University Journal of International Law & Politics

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 144119086