Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU. / Wind, Marlene; Mayoral, Juan A. .

I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 29, Nr. 9, 2022, s. 1433-1453.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Wind, M & Mayoral, JA 2022, 'Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU', Journal of European Public Policy, bind 29, nr. 9, s. 1433-1453. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925

APA

Wind, M., & Mayoral, J. A. (2022). Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU. Journal of European Public Policy, 29(9), 1433-1453. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925

Vancouver

Wind M, Mayoral JA. Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU. Journal of European Public Policy. 2022;29(9):1433-1453. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925

Author

Wind, Marlene ; Mayoral, Juan A. . / Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU. I: Journal of European Public Policy. 2022 ; Bind 29, Nr. 9. s. 1433-1453.

Bibtex

@article{37ded85873934ed8b048caaf04943374,
title = "Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics?: The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts{\textquoteright} cooperation with the CJEU",
abstract = "Though the EU is a rule of law community it struggles to make all Member States engage fully in upholding its laws and values. Some issues have to do with concrete violations against basic rights others are more institutional having to do with the independence of the judicial system as such. In this article, we look at the institutional side demonstrating that there is a link between the degree to which the judicial branch of a Member State enjoys full independence and its national high court engagement with the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure. While drawing on judicial dialogue instruments, it is demonstrated how higher courts that are less constrained by political power make more preliminary references. This finding supports the hypothesis that governments that keep courts in a short leach often discourage judges from engaging with Luxembourg, impacting in the longer run the uniform development of EU law.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, CJEU, Court of Justice of the European Union, judicial independence, national courts, preliminary references",
author = "Marlene Wind and Mayoral, {Juan A.}",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "1433--1453",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "9",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics?

T2 - The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU

AU - Wind, Marlene

AU - Mayoral, Juan A.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Though the EU is a rule of law community it struggles to make all Member States engage fully in upholding its laws and values. Some issues have to do with concrete violations against basic rights others are more institutional having to do with the independence of the judicial system as such. In this article, we look at the institutional side demonstrating that there is a link between the degree to which the judicial branch of a Member State enjoys full independence and its national high court engagement with the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure. While drawing on judicial dialogue instruments, it is demonstrated how higher courts that are less constrained by political power make more preliminary references. This finding supports the hypothesis that governments that keep courts in a short leach often discourage judges from engaging with Luxembourg, impacting in the longer run the uniform development of EU law.

AB - Though the EU is a rule of law community it struggles to make all Member States engage fully in upholding its laws and values. Some issues have to do with concrete violations against basic rights others are more institutional having to do with the independence of the judicial system as such. In this article, we look at the institutional side demonstrating that there is a link between the degree to which the judicial branch of a Member State enjoys full independence and its national high court engagement with the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure. While drawing on judicial dialogue instruments, it is demonstrated how higher courts that are less constrained by political power make more preliminary references. This finding supports the hypothesis that governments that keep courts in a short leach often discourage judges from engaging with Luxembourg, impacting in the longer run the uniform development of EU law.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - CJEU

KW - Court of Justice of the European Union

KW - judicial independence

KW - national courts

KW - preliminary references

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2021.1974925

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 1433

EP - 1453

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 9

ER -

ID: 284769181