Violating International Law is Contagious

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research

Standard

Violating International Law is Contagious. / Dothan, Shai.

In: Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2022, p. 79-89.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research

Harvard

Dothan, S 2022, 'Violating International Law is Contagious', Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 79-89. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/cjil23&i=83>

APA

Dothan, S. (2022). Violating International Law is Contagious. Chicago Journal of International Law, 23(1), 79-89. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/cjil23&i=83

Vancouver

Dothan S. Violating International Law is Contagious. Chicago Journal of International Law. 2022;23(1):79-89.

Author

Dothan, Shai. / Violating International Law is Contagious. In: Chicago Journal of International Law. 2022 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 79-89.

Bibtex

@article{aa5eeb8759f04cf0bb143e120eade7e2,
title = "Violating International Law is Contagious",
abstract = "Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is amechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but alsoincrease their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with internationallaw is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not astrategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate internationallaw, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating internationallaw contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they breakinternational law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.",
author = "Shai Dothan",
year = "2022",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "79--89",
journal = "Chicago Journal of International Law",
issn = "1529-0816",
publisher = "The University of Chicago Law School",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Violating International Law is Contagious

AU - Dothan, Shai

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is amechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but alsoincrease their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with internationallaw is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not astrategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate internationallaw, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating internationallaw contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they breakinternational law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.

AB - Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is amechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but alsoincrease their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with internationallaw is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not astrategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate internationallaw, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating internationallaw contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they breakinternational law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 79

EP - 89

JO - Chicago Journal of International Law

JF - Chicago Journal of International Law

SN - 1529-0816

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 300076845